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INTRODUCTION
Determining whether a suspect of a crime is “in custody” is a fact-
specific inquiry that asks simply: Would a reasonable person feel free
to leave the police?1  The answer has implications that are now a “part
of our national culture.”2  If a reasonable person would not feel free
to leave, police must administer Miranda warnings prior to question-
ing the suspect; otherwise, any statements the suspect makes are inad-
missible.3  Per Miranda, police must inform the suspect of the right to
remain silent and the right to an attorney.4
The custody determination is thus critically important for sus-
pects.  In analyzing situations that are ambiguously custodial, such as
traffic stops, courts have traditionally looked at a variety of circum-
stances.5  For instance, a situation is more likely custodial if the ques-
tioning took place in a police station as opposed to a private home,6
if the detention was long in duration,7 or if there were many police
officers present.8  However, none of these factors are determinative.
Thus, if police asked the suspect to come to the police station and
then allowed the suspect to leave, the interview was likely noncus-
todial, or “voluntary.”9
In June 2013 in Salinas v. Texas, the Supreme Court did not ex-
plicitly change the traditional custody analysis.  In Salinas, the Court
held that a suspect’s refusal to answer an officer’s question during a
voluntary interview could be used as evidence of guilt at trial.10  On its
1 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011).
2 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (describing Miranda
warnings).
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).  The Supreme Court has clarified
that statements obtained in violation of Miranda are inadmissible as part of the prosecu-
tion’s case-in-chief, but they may be admissible for other purposes, such as impeachment.
See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
4 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.  Furthermore, suspects may not actually invoke Mi-
randa rights outside custodial interrogation. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. R
6 See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 349 (1976).
7 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
8 See id. at 438.
9 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 494 (1977) (per curiam).
10 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78.  The full holding of Salinas is that the prosecution
may, at trial, affirmatively use silence from a voluntary interview unless the suspect invokes
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN106.txt unknown Seq: 3 24-NOV-14 10:53
2014] WHY SALINAS V. TEXAS BLURS THE LINE 215
face, Salinas was simply a rollback of suspects’ rights in voluntary inter-
views: police asked the suspect Genovevo Salinas an accusatory ques-
tion, Salinas remained silent, and at trial the court allowed the
prosecutor to comment on that silence by arguing that only a guilty
person “wouldn’t answer that question.”11  Straightforwardly, the Sali-
nas decision took away the right to remain silent in a voluntary-inter-
view setting.
But on a deeper level, the holding affects whether Salinas’s inter-
view was actually noncustodial.  In essence, if prosecutors may use the
refusal to answer questions in a voluntary interview as evidence of
guilt, can suspects leave the interview once it has begun without build-
ing a case against themselves?  After Salinas, the answer is no.  A prose-
cutor could infer that a suspect who leaves a voluntary interview
before police stop questioning has refused to answer questions and
argue that the suspect is therefore guilty.12  Tying this into the custody
determination, if custody depends on whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave—and now suspects cannot leave a voluntary
interview without incriminating themselves—then suspects should no
longer feel reasonably free to leave.  In essence, Salinas makes volun-
tary interviews function like custodial interrogations.
This Note argues that Salinas blurs the line between voluntary in-
terviews and custodial interrogations.  Part I summarizes Salinas and
gives a brief legal history surrounding the right to remain silent.  Part
II analyzes how Salinas blurs the line between voluntary interviews and
custodial interrogations.  Part III explores the far-reaching implica-
the right to remain silent. Id. at 2178.  However, the Court has repeatedly said that a
suspect in a voluntary interview does not actually have the right to remain silent. See infra
note 79 and accompanying text.  The Court even believes it is an open question whether R
the prosecution can use that attempted invocation as evidence of guilt. See Salinas, 133 S.
Ct. at 2179.  So it is entirely unclear what the Court practically meant when it said that the
“petitioner was required to assert the [the right to remain silent] in order to benefit from
it.” Id. at 2178.
11 See Salinas v. State, 368 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, 369 S.W.3d 176
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
12 The decision in Salinas deals specifically with silence in response to a question, but
the Court has repeatedly used the term “silence” more broadly.  “Silence” includes not
only muteness in response to a question but also a general refusal or failure to come for-
ward with information. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 554–55, 559 (1980)
(describing the refusal to name coconspirators as silence); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
614–15 (1976) (describing the failure to come forward with an exculpatory story as si-
lence); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (describing the refusal to testify at
trial as silence); see also Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 538
(2012) (“[T]he Court uses the same phrase, ‘right to remain silent,’ to describe what are
really two distinct sub-rights: (i) the right literally not to speak and (ii) the right to cut off
police questioning.”); Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little:
Reassessing the Probative Value of Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21, 53 (2008) (describing
silence as the “failure to communicate with law enforcement” (quoting the then-proposed
rule)).  Thus, the Court’s terminology indicates that leaving an interview altogether in re-
sponse to a question constitutes silence.
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tions of redefining custody and demonstrates that Salinas will have the
greatest effect on groups that are already overrepresented in our crim-
inal justice system.  Finally, Part IV asks whether silence is even proba-
tive of guilt in the first place.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Facts of Salinas
Two brothers were shot and killed in Houston, Texas, on Decem-
ber 18, 1992.13  Police investigated and eventually visited Genovevo
Salinas, an acquaintance of the brothers, at his home.14  After confis-
cating a shotgun, they asked Salinas to come back to the police station
for a voluntary interview.15  Salinas agreed and accompanied them to
the station.16  Salinas answered questions for about an hour, but when
police asked him whether his shotgun “would match the shells recov-
ered at the scene of the murder,” Salinas remained silent.17  He then
resumed answering other questions.18
Salinas was later charged with murder.19  At his first trial, the
prosecution did not comment on Salinas’s silence when police asked
him about the shotgun shells.20  The jury could not agree on a verdict,
and the first trial resulted in a mistrial.21
However, at Salinas’s second trial, the prosecution sought to in-
troduce evidence of his refusal to answer the shotgun shell question.22
The police officer testified specifically that instead of answering, Sali-
nas “[l]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip,
cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.”23  During
his closing argument, the prosecutor then commented at length on
Salinas’s silence:
The police officer testified that he wouldn’t answer that question.
He didn’t want to answer that.  Probably the first time [Salinas] real-
izes you can do that.  What?  You can compare [shotguns with
shells]?  You know, if you asked somebody—there is a murder in




17 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 2177.
20 See Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct.
2174 (2013).
21 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246), 2013
WL 633595.
22 Salinas, 369 S.W.3d at 177.
23 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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New York City, is your gun going to match up the murder in New
York City?  Is your DNA going to be on that body or that person’s
fingernails?  Is [sic] your fingerprints going to be on that body?  You
are going to say no.  An innocent person is going to say: What are
you talking about?  I didn’t do that.  I wasn’t there.  He didn’t re-
spond that way.  He didn’t say: No, it’s not going to match up.  It’s
my shotgun.  It’s been in our house.  What are you talking about?
He wouldn’t answer that question.24
After hearing this argument, the second jury convicted Salinas of
murder.25
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.26  In Salinas v. Texas,
the Court held that the prosecution could use Salinas’s silence in a
response to a question during a voluntary interview as evidence of
guilt at trial.27
B. The Right to Remain Silent
Salinas was not the first time the Supreme Court considered the
prosecution’s use of a person’s silence as evidence of guilt.  Prior deci-
sions about the prosecution’s use of silence are grounded in the Fifth
Amendment, which states that no person “shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”28
1. The Foundation: Griffin v. California
Griffin v. California, decided in 1965, provides a foundation for
the prosecution’s use of silence as evidence of guilt.29  The defendant
in Griffin chose not to testify while on trial for murder.30  The prosecu-
tor commented specifically on this failure to testify, noting during
closing arguments that the defendant “ha[d] not seen fit to take the
stand and deny or explain” any of the allegations.31  The Supreme
Court held that by commenting on the defendant’s decision not to
testify, the prosecutor was asking the jury to infer guilt from the defen-
dant’s exercise of his right not to be a witness against himself.32  In
other words, the prosecutor’s comment was a “penalty imposed” on
the defendant for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to remain
24 Salinas v. State, 368 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (third alteration in origi-
nal), aff’d, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
25 Id. at 554.
26 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179.
27 See id. at 2177–78.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
29 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965).
30 Id. at 609–10.
31 Id. at 610–11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 See id.
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silent.33  Accordingly, Griffin prohibits prosecutors from commenting
on a defendant’s refusal to testify at trial.34
2. Miranda and Its Progeny
The Court analyzed the right to remain silent outside the court-
room in Miranda v. Arizona.35  In a landmark ruling, the Court ruled
that police must inform suspects of their right to remain silent before
a custodial interrogation; otherwise, those suspects’ statements are
inadmissible.36
Doyle v. Ohio later clarified how Miranda affected the prosecu-
tion’s use of a defendant’s silence in a post-arrest setting.37  In Doyle,
police arrested two men on drug charges and read them their Mi-
randa rights.38 After hearing their rights, the men failed to tell police
that they believed they were framed by the police informant.39  They
then testified as to their “frameup story” for the first time at trial.40
The prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendants’ credibility by
noting that they had not told police the frameup story after being
arrested and read their rights.41  In other words, the prosecution ar-
gued that because the defendants had remained silent as to their story
after arrest, they were likely not telling the truth at trial.42
The Supreme Court found the prosecution’s impeachment tech-
nique a violation of due process.43  Because the defendants were ar-
rested and apprised of their right to remain silent per Miranda, the
Court held that they may have just been exercising this right in not
telling police their exculpatory story.44  Thus, their silence was “in-
solubly ambiguous.”45  Accordingly, prosecutors may not use a defen-
dant’s silence after Miranda warnings for impeachment at trial.46
The Court again considered the use of silence as an impeach-
ment technique in Jenkins v. Anderson.47  In Jenkins, the defendant
waited two weeks before surrendering to police for killing a man dur-
ing a fight.48  At trial, the defendant testified that he had acted in self-
33 Id. at 614.
34 Id.
35 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36 See id. at 478–79.  See infra Part II.A for a discussion of custodial interrogation.
37 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
38 See id. at 611.
39 See id.
40 Id. at 613–14.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 614.
43 Id. at 619.
44 Id. at 617.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
48 Id. at 232–33.
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defense.49  The prosecution attempted to impeach the defendant by
inferring that he would have come forward immediately—not after
two weeks—if the self-defense story were true.50
The Court departed from Doyle and allowed the prosecutor to use
silence as an impeachment technique.51  It reasoned that police in
Doyle had given the defendants their Miranda warnings, thus the Doyle
defendants were possibly heeding that warning through silence; the
defendant here was not arrested and thus was not read his Miranda
rights.52  Thus, there was less reason to believe the Jenkins defendant
was exercising a right and more reason to believe his silence meant
that he fabricated the story.53  Accordingly, Jenkins stands for the pro-
position that prosecutors may impeach defendants with their pre-
arrest silence.54
The Court revisited the prosecutor’s use of silence as an impeach-
ment technique one more time in Fletcher v. Weir.55  The defendant in
Fletcher was on trial for manslaughter and again was not immediately
forthcoming with his assertion of self-defense.56  Crucially, in the
Court’s opinion, there was a delay between the defendant’s arrest and
the time when police gave him his Miranda warnings.57  The defen-
dant was silent as to self-defense during this delay.58  The Court held
that this silence was admissible for impeachment purposes, because
police had not yet “induced silence” through Miranda warnings.59
3. Summary of the Law
Thus, to briefly summarize the cases leading up to Salinas, the
prosecution may not comment at all on a defendant’s silence in terms
of a failure to testify at trial.60  However, if the defendant testifies at
trial, the prosecution may impeach the defendant with silence if that
silence occurred prior to Miranda warnings.61  Prosecutors may not
impeach with post-Miranda silence, because the defendant may simply
be heeding the “right to remain silent” in the Miranda warning.62
49 Id. at 233.
50 See id. at 233–34.
51 See id. at 238.
52 See id. at 239–40.
53 See id. at 240.
54 See id.
55 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
56 See id. at 603.
57 See id. at 604.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 606.
60 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965).
61 See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606.
62 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
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In sum, the Court has hinged the use of silence on Miranda warn-
ings. Salinas is thus a predictable progression from the Supreme
Court’s prior decisions: Salinas allows the prosecution to use pre-
Miranda silence as part of its case-in-chief, not just for impeachment.63
Part II now explores why the Court has drawn such a bright line at
Miranda, and it examines Salinas’s effect on that line.
II
SALINAS BLURS THE LINE BETWEEN VOLUNTARY INTERVIEWS
AND CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
The Court’s decision in Salinas to allow prosecutors to use silence
in a pre-Miranda, voluntary-interview setting as evidence of guilt un-
doubtedly makes those interviews more dangerous for suspects.  But it
also fundamentally changes the nature of voluntary interviews.  To ex-
amine the line between voluntary interviews and custodial interroga-
tions in the wake of Salinas, it is useful to first examine custodial
interrogations and then consider how Salinas changes voluntary inter-
views into custodial interrogations.
A. Custodial Interrogations
A custodial interrogation is made up of two self-evident prongs:
custody and interrogation.64  In other words, for suspects to be in a
custodial interrogation—and thus to receive Miranda warnings—they
must be both (a) in custody and (b) subject to interrogation.65  Cus-
tody distinguishes voluntary interviews from custodial interrogations,
so the custody prong deserves the most attention here.
1. Custody
Suspects are clearly “in custody” when police arrest them, place
them in handcuffs, and escort them to the police station.66  But cus-
tody is a term of art when the situation is ambiguous, such as a traffic
stop.67  In these situations, the relevant inquiry becomes whether a
reasonable person would feel free to leave, or more specifically,
63 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
64 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (defining custodial interrogation);
see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings are not
required when a subject is in custody but not subject to interrogation).
65 See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297.
66 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (“There can be no question that
respondent was ‘in custody’ at least as of the moment he was formally placed under arrest
and instructed to get into the police car.”).
67 The Supreme Court has determined that traffic stops are noncustodial. See id. at
439–40.
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whether a reasonable person’s “freedom to depart” from police was
restricted “in any significant way.”68
Custody is an objective, totality of the circumstances test.69  So, if
the questioning took place in a police station as opposed to in a pri-
vate home,70 if the questioning was long in duration,71 or if there were
many police officers present,72 the situation was more likely custodial.
Courts may also consider whether the questioning was investigatory or
accusatory in nature.73  Notably, the Supreme Court has twice found
that an interview was noncustodial, or voluntary, when police asked
the suspect to come to the police station and then allowed the suspect
to leave once the interview was over.74  In fact, when police have used
this method of first asking suspects to come to the station and then
allowing them to leave, some courts have determined that the inter-
view was voluntary without even considering other circumstances in
the custody analysis.75
It is worth pausing for a moment to examine this method, both
because courts seem to give it such great weight in the custody analysis
and because police used it on Genovevo Salinas.76  At surface level, it
is easy to see why courts give it such great weight: the custody analysis
asks whether a reasonable suspect would feel free to leave, and the
method involves police asking for an interview and then actually al-
lowing the suspect to leave.  But anyone who has ever been asked
questions by police in any setting undoubtedly feels pressure to re-
spond and not just walk away.  Thus, the custody analysis should not
simply end because the suspect has some agency in coming to and
leaving the interview.
68 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
69 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110–14 (1995).
70 See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 342 (1976); see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
437–38 (asserting that roadside questioning is less coercive than questioning at a police
station).
71 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437–38; Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 342.
72 See Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 342 (finding a detention noncustodial where only one or
two police officers were present).
73 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (determin-
ing that suspects deserve protection when questioning “shifts from investigatory to
accusatory”).
74 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122 (1983) (per curiam) (determining
suspect who agreed to accompany police to the station and was then permitted to go home
was not in custody); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493–94 (1977) (per curiam) (de-
termining that suspect was not in custody when officers left note asking suspect to come to
police station and then allowed him to leave).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Mi-
randa, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1524 (2008) (showing that police are trained to use the
method to sidestep Miranda warnings).
76 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013).
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Rather, as the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed, courts
should “examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interroga-
tion.”77  Delving into the specifics of each case is important because
the suspect has so much at stake.  In a voluntary interview, police do
not have to inform suspects of their Miranda rights.78  Additionally,
suspects may not even invoke Miranda rights in anticipation of custo-
dial interrogation.  In other words, if a suspect is not in custody and
attempts to invoke the right to remain silent, police do not have to
cease questioning.79  In fact, the Court in Salinas left open the ques-
tion of whether the prosecution can actually use the suspect’s at-
tempted invocation in a voluntary interview as evidence of guilt at
trial.80  Accordingly, suspects are extraordinarily vulnerable in volun-
tary interviews, and thus police have a strong incentive to interview all
but the most imminently dangerous suspects outside of custody.81
This is why it is so important to closely examine all of the circum-
stances to determine whether a reasonable suspect would feel free to
leave.
2. Interrogation
The Court has defined interrogation as “express questioning or
its functional equivalent.”82  So in voluntary interviews when police
expressly question the suspect, the interview is actually an interroga-
tion.  Put differently, only the custody determination separates a cus-
todial interrogation from a voluntary interview.
The “functional equivalent” of questioning, however, may be rele-
vant for communications between police and the suspect before the vol-
untary interview.  In Salinas, some communications occurred before
Salinas’s interview: police officers showed up at Salinas’s house, took
his shotgun, and requested that he come back to the station for an
77 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (emphasis added);
see also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (reiterating the objective-
inquiry test); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661–62 (2004); Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 438–39 (1984).
78 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
79 See Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29 (2011) (“[T]his Court has never held that a
person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than custodial inter-
rogation.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
182 n.3 (1991))); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 795 (2009) (“If the defendant
is not in custody then [Miranda and its progeny] do not apply . . . .”).
80 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (declining to reach the question of whether the prose-
cution can use a suspect’s invocation of Miranda rights in a voluntary interview in its case-
in-chief).
81 Cf. Marc Scott Hennes, Note, Manipulating Miranda: United States v. Frazier and the
Case-in-Chief Use of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1013, 1037 (2007)
(“The current system provides an incentive for officers to postpone Mirandizing a
suspect . . . .”).
82 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980).
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interview.83  The functional equivalent of questioning is defined as
“words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from [the suspect].”84  This is
relevant here because while the police’s request for Salinas to come
back to the station for an interview may not qualify as express ques-
tioning, in the wake of the Salinas decision it may have been reasona-
bly likely to elicit an incriminating response.  The next section, which
explores custodial interrogations post-Salinas, posits that interrogation
may have actually started with the voluntary interview request.
B. Voluntary Interviews Post-Salinas
Salinas blurs the line between voluntary interviews and custodial
interrogations.  This is because Salinas makes voluntary interviews
much more coercive on the custody prong.  Interestingly, it also
makes the interview request more coercive on both the custody prong
and the interrogation prong.
1. Custody
Both the prosecution and defense agreed at trial that Salinas was
not in custody during his interview at the police station.85  In other
words, the parties agreed that because Salinas agreed to accompany
police back to the station and then left when the interview was over,86
his “freedom to depart” was not restricted “in any significant way.”87
However, per the traditional custody analysis, there were certainly
circumstances present that restricted Salinas’s freedom to leave the
interview.  The interview took place at the police station as opposed to
Salinas’s home.88  Police told Salinas that they were investigating a
double murder and took Salinas’s shotgun while at his home, so Sali-
nas knew he was a primary suspect for the murders.89  The interview
lasted about an hour,90 which is within the range of an average inter-
rogation and much longer than, for instance, a traffic stop.91
83 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
84 Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 (determining that an officer’s remark to another officer in a
suspect’s presence that a child might find the missing murder weapon was not reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response).
85 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (“[I]t is undisputed that his interview with police was
voluntary.”).
86 See id.
87 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494–95 (1977) (per curiam).
88 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: Why Innocent People Confess, 32 AM. J. TRIAL AD-
VOC. 525, 534 (2009) (“The average police interrogation lasts thirty minutes to an
hour . . . .”).
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But the Salinas decision adds another powerful circumstance to
the traditional custody analysis.  By allowing the prosecution to com-
ment on Salinas’s refusal to answer a question, the Court allows the
prosecution to comment on a suspect’s refusal to answer a question by
walking out of the interview.  In other words, if Salinas left the inter-
view at any point, the prosecutor could say that not only did Salinas
refuse to answer a question but he refused to answer a question by
leaving the room altogether.  The prosecutor could then make an ar-
gument similar to the one made at Salinas’s trial: An innocent person
would never walk out of an interview with police after two of his ac-
quaintances were murdered the night before.  More concretely, when
police asked Salinas whether his shotgun “would match the shells re-
covered at the scene of the murder,”92 Salinas’s ability to depart was
limited: it only existed so long as he accepted that his departure could
be used as evidence of guilt at trial.  In essence, the Salinas decision
adds a circumstance to the custody analysis that tends to make all vol-
untary interviews look more custodial.
While voluntary interviews are now more custodial for all sus-
pects, they are particularly custodial for guilty suspects.  Assume for
the sake of argument that Salinas actually committed the crime and
then consider the critical moment when police asked Salinas whether
his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the
murder.”93  Salinas’s freedom of action was so limited at this moment
that that there was no way for him to respond and not incriminate
himself in some way.  He had four options.  First, he could have con-
fessed to the crime, which would have been straightforwardly incrimi-
nating.  Second, he could have remained silent or otherwise refused
to answer, and then faced the consequence that silence is itself incrim-
inating.  Third, he could have tried to assert his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent or his right to counsel, but that assertion may
also have been incriminating.94  Fourth, he could have lied about the
shotgun shells and risked an obstruction-related charge.95  In essence,
once police asked Salinas whether his shotgun shells would match, his
freedom to act was very limited if he was guilty.  The accusatory ques-
tion effectively placed a guilty Salinas in custody.
92 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93 Id.
94 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. R
95 Lying to law enforcement officers is a crime under state law, see e.g., TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 37.08 (West 2011), and federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).  These four
options are a variation on Justice Arthur Goldberg’s “cruel trilemma”: suspects must retain
the right against self-incrimination because otherwise, in response to an accusation, they
must choose between “self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”  Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).  By making silence incriminating, Salinas
makes for an even crueler quadrilemma, where suspects have no option but to choose one of
four ways to incriminate themselves.
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Of course, Salinas also limits the actions of innocent suspects.  As
Justice Stephen Breyer pointed out in his dissent, an innocent person
may still not want to answer questions as “he may well reveal, for ex-
ample, prejudicial facts, disreputable associates, or suspicious circum-
stances . . . .”96  An innocent person could make a false statement to
cover up those suspicious circumstances and be prosecuted for mak-
ing the false statement.97  Even more disconcertingly, speaking during
a voluntary interview could produce false confessions, which have led
to the convictions of an extraordinary number of individuals who have
later been exonerated by DNA testing.98  These false confessions can
appear particularly trustworthy because police may inadvertently re-
veal details about the crime to suspects during the interview, and sus-
pects then parrot back those details during their false confessions.99
The point is that even innocent suspects have good reason to remain
silent during a voluntary interview.  The Salinas decision makes that
silence incriminating so that even innocent people are now restricted
as to how they can act in a voluntary interview.  The end result is that
voluntary interviews are also more custodial for innocent suspects.
Furthermore, the Salinas decision may actually make communica-
tions before the interview more custodial.  Consider the moment when
police entered Salinas’s house and asked him to come to the station
for an interview.100  Was he actually free to refuse the interview?  The
decision in Salinas expressly allows prosecutors to comment on de-
fendants’ refusal to answer questions in a noncustodial setting,101 and
Salinas would be doing just that by declining the interview request.  So
he was actually not free to refuse without incriminating himself.  The
prosecutor could make an argument similar to the one made at Sali-
nas’s trial: An innocent person would never completely refuse to an-
swer questions after two of his acquaintances were murdered the night
96 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also James Duane, Don’t
Talk to Police, YOUTUBE (June 21, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wXkI4t7nuc
(giving an example of how innocent people can incriminate themselves, at 21:30–25:00).
97 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
98 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG 18–19 (2011) (examining 250 DNA exonerees and finding that 40 of them had
falsely confessed).
99 Brandon L. Garrett, Remaining Silent After Salinas, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 116, 124
(2013); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 491–92 (1998) (finding that confessions “substantially bias”
triers of fact even when confession was elicited by coercive techniques and other evidence
suggests that defendant is innocent).
100 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
101 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78.
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before.102  In essence, the Salinas decision makes even an officer’s
request for an interview more custodial.
In a functional sense, the implication of Salinas on the custody
analysis is clear: it adds another circumstance—alongside circum-
stances such as place of the interview, duration of the interview, and
number of officers present at the interview—that tends to make all
voluntary interviews with police more custodial.103  Courts should be
up front in their analyses and consider Salinas along with the other
circumstances.  The result should be that, in interviews that already
have a fair number of custodial circumstances present, Salinas tips the
scales in favor of custody.  Consequently, courts should find that many
more suspects who are subject to voluntary interviews, and possibly
even voluntary interview requests, are actually in custody.
Before moving to the interrogation prong, there is one obvious
counterargument to considering the Salinas decision as an additional
circumstance alongside more tangible custodial circumstances like
place and duration of the interview.  It is that suspects may not be
aware of the effects of leaving the interview; thus, they do not actually
feel the coercive effects of Salinas as they do when the interview is
long in duration or at the police station.  However, this argument fails
in light of the fact that the custody analysis is an objective test that asks
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.104  Conse-
quently, it would be difficult for courts to find that a reasonable per-
son would not be aware of Salinas, and thus Salinas should not factor
into the custody analysis.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rein-
forced the objective test by asserting that neither police officers’ sub-
jective knowledge about whether they plan on arresting a suspect,105
nor suspects’ “actual mindset[s]” about whether they are in custody,
should factor into the custody analysis.106  Accordingly, whether sus-
pects know they can walk away without incriminating themselves also
should not factor into the custody analysis.
2. Interrogation
The decision in Salinas has less of an effect on the interrogation
prong of the custodial interrogation analysis.  As previously stated, this
102 To compare this with the prosecutor’s actual argument at trial see Salinas v. State,
368 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012),
aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
103 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. R
104 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113–14 (1995).
105 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“A policeman’s unarticulated
plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular
time . . . .”).
106 See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004).
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is because an interview already consists of “express questioning,” so in
a legal sense, it is already an interrogation.107
However, the Salinas decision may affect the interview request on
the interrogation prong, just as it did on the custody prong.  When
police officers asked Salinas to come to the station for an interview,
their request was likely not “express questioning,” as such questioning
traditionally refers to questions directly related to the crime.108  But
words or actions can also be the “functional equivalent” of express
questioning, and thus qualify as an interrogation, if they are “reasona-
bly likely to elicit an incriminating response.”109
The Salinas decision makes an interview request much more
likely to elicit an incriminating response.  This is because suspects can
now incriminate themselves in a brand-new way, by simply refusing
the interview request.  Notably, refusing such a request would be wise
considering the vulnerability of suspects in voluntary interviews.110
But the problem is that when suspects refuse the request, prosecutors
can now use that refusal as evidence of guilt.  The result is that sus-
pects are much more likely to incriminate themselves in response to a
voluntary interview request, so such requests may themselves be “rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”111  Interestingly,
the Salinas decision functions to makes all police requests for volun-
tary interviews look more like interrogations.
C. Salinas’s Overall Effect on Voluntary Interviews
The overall effect of Salinas is that voluntary interviews, and possi-
bly even voluntary interview requests, now look much more like custo-
dial interrogations.  As for voluntary interviews, once suspects are in
the interview, their freedom to leave before police stop questioning is
restricted by the fact that leaving will be incriminating.  In fact, espe-
cially for guilty suspects, the freedom to act in any way when faced
with an accusatory question is extraordinarily limited.  Even voluntary
interview requests are more coercive on both the custody prong and
interrogation prong as a result of Salinas.  The result is that from the
moment police ask for a voluntary interview, individuals now have
107 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980).
108 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600 (1990) (determining that ques-
tioning a drunk driver about his “sixth birthday” constituted express questioning); Innis,
446 U.S. at 303 (discussing whether an officer’s remark to another officer about a missing
murder weapon was equivalent to express questioning, and ultimately holding that it was
not); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491–92 (1966) (finding that suspect was interro-
gated when officers questioned him about crime).
109 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301–02.
110 See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. R
111 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301–02.
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much less freedom to act.  The following Part explores the implica-
tions of this result.
III
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Changing the nature of voluntary interviews is important prima-
rily because of the implications it has for individuals who talk to po-
lice.  It is useful to first examine these implications from a normative
perspective, in terms of how Salinas ought to affect voluntary inter-
views.  Then, Salinas must be examined from a more realistic perspec-
tive, which is rather discouraging for anyone who talks to police.
A. Salinas’s Implications in a Normative Sense
If courts recognize and act on the reasoning that Salinas makes
voluntary interviews more custodial, they would necessarily provide
more protection for suspects.  Especially in interviews with coercive
circumstances already present—like that of Salinas—courts would
find that the interviews are actually custodial interrogations.112  Thus,
courts would suppress any un-Mirandized statements made by sus-
pects.113  By suppressing the statements, there would be little use for
voluntary interviews, and thus many suspects would regain the protec-
tions tied to custodial interrogations.  Namely, suspects would be in-
formed of their rights to silence and an attorney and be able to
exercise those rights.114
Police investigations would change dramatically.  Gone would be
the days of sidestepping Miranda by simply asking suspects to come to
the police station, questioning them for an hour, and then allowing
them to leave when questioning is over.115  Police would have to
gather information from suspects either by informing them of their
Miranda rights up front or by making a genuine effort to remove coer-
cive circumstances from interrogations.  For instance, police could
question the suspect at home and keep the questioning brief and
nonaccusatory.116  But the end result of Salinas would be that police
would have to give Miranda warnings much more often to suspects
they wanted to question.  Police would also have to give warnings
much earlier in investigations, considering that even interview re-
quests are now more coercive.117  In sum, if courts and police recog-
nize that Salinas transforms many interviews into custodial
112 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
113 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
114 See id.; Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29 (2011); supra note 79.
115 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. R
116 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. R
117 See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. R
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interrogations, suspects would be more protected when police wanted
to talk to them.
B. Salinas’s Implications in a Realistic Sense
Of course, the Salinas decision at heart provides a brand-new way
for suspects to incriminate themselves in voluntary interviews.118
Thus, it is unlikely that the Court meant for criminal suspects to end
up with more protection when they talk to police.  Viewed in context,
Salinas is actually part of a long line of cases that works to erode the
workings of Miranda and decrease the protection of suspects in police
interactions.119  Accordingly, while courts may recognize that Salinas
makes voluntary interviews more custodial, that does not mean courts
will actually act and change the custody analysis.  If they do not, volun-
tary interviews are now more dangerous for suspects and correspond-
ingly more useful for the police and prosecution.
1. If Individuals Use Salinas to Their Advantage
If individuals read this Note and understand the danger of volun-
tary interviews in a post-Salinas world, they would limit all interaction
with police.  Even declining a request for a voluntary interview could
be incriminating, so at present the best approach for individuals who
see police at their front doors is to not even let them in the house.
Not talking to police “under any circumstances” was of course good
practice well before Salinas,120 but Salinas reemphasizes it.  When indi-
viduals are encouraged to avoid all contact with police, police will find
it more difficult to conduct investigations.  Thus, Salinas may paradox-
ically result in fewer prosecutions and convictions of those who com-
mit crimes.
Of course, if individuals simply cannot avoid police, their next
best option is to decline voluntary interviews.  Even without consider-
ing Salinas, individuals are extremely vulnerable in such interviews.121
They are not read Miranda rights, they cannot exercise those rights,
118 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177–78 (2013).
119 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010) (holding that
invocation of right to remain silent must be express and unambiguous); United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004) (holding that physical evidence obtained from un-
Mirandized statements is admissible); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 (1979)
(determining that suspects may implicitly waive Miranda rights); see also George C. Thomas
III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091,
1092 (2003) (“Miranda has been a spectacular failure.”); Weisselberg, supra note 75, at R
1524 (“[L]ittle is left of Miranda’s vaunted safeguards . . . .”).
120 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A]ny lawyer
worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police
under any circumstances.”).
121 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. R
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and even trying to assert them could be incriminating.122 Salinas exac-
erbates that vulnerability by making even silence during the interview
incriminating.123  Again, when suspects decline voluntary interviews, it
hinders police investigations.  Accordingly, Salinas may actually result
in fewer successful prosecutions.
2. If Police Use Salinas to Their Advantage
The foregoing assumes that individuals know about the Salinas
decision and use it to their advantage.  Considering that large parts of
the population do not even understand Miranda rights, this is a mas-
sive assumption.124  It is much more likely that police will understand
Salinas and use it to their advantage, so this section deserves more
attention.
Police have long made strategic use of voluntary interviews.125
This is partly because in a “free flowing and relatively unstructured”
interview, police can develop a rapport with the suspect that may bear
fruit before an accusatory interrogation is even necessary.126  It is also
because suspects are less protected in voluntary interviews or, put dif-
ferently, police retain much more control over voluntary interviews.
This is because police do not have to worry about a suspect stopping
the interview by invoking the right to silence or the right to an
attorney.127
Post-Salinas, the voluntary interview is an even more powerful
tool for police.  The reason is that, as repeatedly stated, Salinas pro-
vides an additional way for police to gain incriminating evidence.128
In fact, police are one accusatory question away from getting guilty
suspects to incriminate themselves one way or another.129  Innocent
suspects are also at a far greater risk for incriminating themselves in
voluntary interviews.130
122 See id.
123 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78.
124 Richard Rogers, Getting it Wrong About Miranda Rights: False Beliefs, Impaired Reason-
ing, and Professional Neglect, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 728, 734 (2011) (“Although streetwise
and legally sophisticated offenders do exist, far more have a limited, often erroneous grasp
of Miranda warnings and the underlying [c]onstitutional safeguards.”).
125 A nationwide survey shows that two-thirds of police departments have trained of-
ficers in the so-called “Reid method.”  Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of
Police Executives Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873,
920 (2007).  Originally devised in 1962, the Reid method advises officers to begin investiga-
tions with “free flowing” interviews as opposed to accusatory interrogations. See FRED E.
INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 7 (4th ed. 2001).
126 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 125, at 7. R
127 See Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29 (2011); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
128 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78.
129 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. R
130 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. R
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But furthermore, Salinas encourages police to use a rather insidi-
ous method of questioning during the interview: surprise the individ-
ual with accusatory questions.  Abruptly asking an individual whether
his shotgun shells will match those at the crime scene maximizes the
chances that, at the very least, police can obtain a surprised, “transi-
tory silence” from the individual who is shocked to realize he is actu-
ally a suspect.131  Stated differently, police would still be wise to start
the interview in an “unstructured” and “free flowing” manner.132  But
Salinas encourages police to then unexpectedly change gears with an
accusatory question, as any hesitation by the suspect is affirmative evi-
dence of guilt at trial.133  Whether silence is probative of guilt at all is
discussed at length in Part IV.  But it is difficult to imagine how silence
due to a suspect’s surprise should be incriminating.  Yet the decision
in Salinas makes no distinction between surprised, “transitory” silence
and extended, more permanent silence,134 so police can maximize
chances of eliciting an incriminating response by being as abrupt as
possible during questioning.
Of course, even the voluntary interview request is now a powerful
tool for police.  Police can start building a case against individuals by
simply asking for an interview.135  If the individual agrees to interview,
police can move forward with the investigation.136  If the individual
refuses, police have the first piece of admissible, incriminating
evidence.137
In sum, Salinas discourages police from arresting suspects, read-
ing them their Miranda rights, and subjecting them to custodial inter-
rogation.  Unless suspects are flight risks or dangerous to the
community, there is no reason to subject them to custodial interroga-
tion. Salinas then encourages police to surprise suspects with accusa-
tory questions during the interview.
Considering that police are more likely than individuals to be in-
formed about the implications of Salinas, the overall implication of
Salinas is that police are incentivized to conduct entire investigations
through voluntary interviews, and individuals are much less protected
when they talk to police.
131 Brief for Respondent at 10, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246),
2013 WL 1225769.
132 INBAU ET AL., supra note 125, at 7. R
133 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183–84.
134 See id.
135 See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. R
136 Id.
137 Id.
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3. Salinas Will Disproportionately Impact Groups That Are Already
Overrepresented in the Criminal Justice System
By encouraging voluntary interviews, Salinas will reduce the pro-
tection of all individuals whom police question.  But for two reasons,
the decision will disproportionately impact demographics that are al-
ready overrepresented in our criminal justice system.  This section
uses black Americans to illustrate this implication.
The first reason why Salinas will disproportionately impact black
Americans is simply because they are more likely to interact with po-
lice.  Crime statistics paint a clear picture.  In terms of arrests, about
12% of the U.S. population is black, yet black Americans make up
30% of those arrested for property crimes and 38% of those arrested
for violent crimes.138  Similarly, from 2004 to 2012 during New York
City’s notorious “stop and frisk” program, 52% of those stopped were
black, despite making up only 23% of New York City’s population.139
Incarceration rates are even more extreme.  Black men are six times
more likely to be imprisoned than white men,140 and if these trends
continue, one in three black males born today can expect to go to
prison in his lifetime.141  Incarceration rates for black women are less
extreme but still very disparate compared to rates for white women.142
These statistics make clear that black Americans are far more
likely to interact with police than white Americans.  Because black
Americans are more likely to interact with police, they are necessarily
more affected by any decrease in protection during police interac-
tions.  In other words, in the same way that more restrictive prison
conditions would disproportionately affect men more than women,143
Salinas disproportionately affects black Americans simply because they
are more likely to be voluntarily interviewed.  The troubling implica-
138 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NA-
TIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publica
tions/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf.
139 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing by
comparison that white Americans make up 33% of the city’s population yet were stopped
only 10% of the time).
140 E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012:
TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 25 tbl.18 (2013), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf.
141 Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S, 88S
(2011), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/prison%20journal%
20-%20racial%20disparity.pdf.
142 See id. (finding that one out of eighteen black women can expect to go to prison as
compared to one out of one-hundred eleven white women).
143 Men outnumbered women in prison by about thirteen times from 2002 to 2012.
See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012—
ADVANCE COUNTS 2 tbl.1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p12ac.pdf.
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tion is that Salinas will end up exacerbating the overrepresentation of
black Americans in our criminal justice system.
The second reason why Salinas will disproportionately impact
black Americans is related to and stems from their relative distrust of
police.  Again, statistics support this premise.  One study shows that
54% of black Americans say they have a “great deal” or “fair amount”
of confidence in police to do a good job at enforcing the law as com-
pared to 78% of white Americans.144  Less than four in ten black
Americans trust police to treat black Americans and white Americans
equally.145  More dramatically, approximately 80% of black Ameri-
cans, but only approximately 25% of white Americans, consider it a
“serious problem” that police “stop and question [b]lacks far more
often than [w]hites.”146  In short, the majority of black Americans “re-
main broadly skeptical of the police in their communities.”147
In the wake of Salinas, this suspicion poses a problem for black
Americans if it manifests itself to police.  Recall that at Genovevo Sali-
nas’s trial, the police officer who testified not only said that Salinas
remained silent in response to a question, but also that he “[l]ooked
down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his
hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.”148  The prosecution ar-
gued that the reaction showed guilt.149  But alternatively, Salinas’s re-
action could have shown a man deeply suspicious of police.
This is important because a black man may be more likely to hesi-
tate and “tighten up” in response to a question by police not because
he is guilty but because he is more likely to distrust police.150  In short,
a major problem with the Salinas decision is that it is virtually impossi-
ble to explain what silence coupled with signs of nervousness actually
means.  Yet testimony about that silence is extremely damaging and
hard to rebut, largely because it is so hard to discern what it means in
the first place.151  Part IV discusses the probativeness of silence more
generally, but black Americans may be especially prone to incriminate
144 PEW RES. CTR., A YEAR AFTER OBAMA’S ELECTION: BLACKS UPBEAT ABOUT BLACK PRO-
GRESS, PROSPECTS 43 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/blacks-
upbeat-about-black-progress-prospects.pdf.
145 Id.
146 MARK PEFFLEY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF
BLACKS AND WHITES 43 fig.2.1 (2010).
147 PEW RES. CTR., supra note 144, at 43. R
148 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (alterations in original).
149 See id.
150 See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. R
151 Recall that in Salinas’s first trial, the prosecutor did not elicit testimony from the
police officer about Salinas’s silence, and the trial ended with a hung jury.  The prosecu-
tor’s testimony about Salinas’s silence comes from the second trial, where Salinas was con-
victed. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246),
2013 WL 633595.
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themselves with this type of evidence because of their relative distrust
of police.
In sum, the Salinas decision is likely to disproportionately impact
black Americans.  Black Americans interact with police more often,152
and their comparative distrust of police may manifest itself and be
construed as consciousness of guilt.153  This reasoning also applies to
other groups who are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.
In particular, repeat offenders154 and the uneducated155 are more
likely to interact with police and thus may have similar reasons to be
suspicious or distrustful of them.  The overall implication is that Sali-
nas may exacerbate the problem of overrepresentation of certain
groups in our criminal justice system.
IV
IS SILENCE PROBATIVE OF GUILT?
The penultimate Part of this Note addresses the question at the
forefront of any case about silence: Is silence probative of guilt?  The
Supreme Court itself has noted that “[i]n most circumstances silence
is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force.”156  Accordingly, any
discussion of Salinas would be incomplete without considering
whether the assumption behind the prosecutor’s argument about Sali-
nas’s silence was valid in the first place.
A. The Assumption
It is an age-old assumption that when faced with an accusation,
the innocent speak while the guilty remain silent.157  One scholar
traces the idea back to Pope Boniface VIII, who decreed in the 1300s
that “[h]e who is silent, agrees.”158  Jeremy Bentham also famously
152 See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text. R
153 See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. R
154 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S
PRISONS 9 (2011) (finding that 45.4% of inmates released in 1999 returned to prison
within three years, and 43.3% of inmates released in 2004 returned to prison within three
years).
155 See Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from
Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 160 tbl.2, 175 tbl.10 (2004)
(finding that a reduced probability of incarceration and arrest is associated with higher
schooling).
156 United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).
157 See Charles W. Gamble, The Tacit Admission Rule: Unreliable and Unconstitutional—A
Doctrine Ripe for Abandonment, 14 GA. L. REV. 27, 34 (1979) (articulating a “legal presump-
tion that all silence concurrent with accusation is prompted by a consciousness of guilt”);
Stefan H. Krieger, A Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak: The Functions of Silence in the
Lawyering Process, 80 OR. L. REV. 199, 220 (2001) (“The most popular understanding of
silence as communication is the belief that the failure of one party to a communication to
respond to another party implies assent.”).
158 Gamble, supra note 157, at 31. R
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lamented that the right to silence only helps the guilty.159  The “com-
mon sense psychology” that silence equals guilt160 is even enshrined in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Rule 801(d)(2)(B) excludes from
hearsay so-called adoptive admissions, which are out-of-court state-
ments offered against a party-opponent that “the party manifested
that it adopted or believed to be true.”161  In practice, this rule treats a
party’s silence in response to an out-of-court accusation just as it
would a regular admission; the silent party effectively adopts the accu-
sation as true.162
Though not stated specifically in the Salinas decision, Rule
801(d)(2)(B) is the reason why Salinas’s silence was admitted into evi-
dence.  By failing to respond to whether his shotgun “would match
the shells recovered at the scene of the murder,” Salinas adopted the
accusation.163  The prosecutor then based his closing argument on
the same “common sense”164 assumption that allowed the silence into
evidence in the first place: only a guilty person would remain silent in
the face of an accusation.165
1. Skepticism About the Assumption
The Salinas decision acknowledges the potential problem with
the assumption by noting briefly that “[n]ot every such possible expla-
nation for silence is probative of guilt.”166  Yet that acknowledgement
understates the problem considering that essentially no empirical
basis exists for using silence as evidence of assent or guilt.167  In fact,
cracks in the conventional wisdom about silence have slowly been
forming in other spheres of the criminal justice system.  For example,
with regard to rape, the “fresh-complaint doctrine” dates back to the
thirteenth century and proceeds on the assumption that if rape vic-
tims do not immediately report the rape, it must not have occurred.168
Yet studies have shown the assumption to be empirically false—the
vast majority of rape victims neither report the rape immediately nor
159 Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 436 (2000).
160 Gamble, supra note 157, at 34. R
161 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
163 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
164 Gamble, supra note 157, at 31. R
165 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
166 See id. at 2176.
167 See Gamble, supra note 157, at 32 (“The presumptive basis for the [Adoptive] Ad- R
mission Rule has never been scientifically tested . . . .”); Shmuel Leshem, The Benefits of a
Right to Silence for the Innocent, 41 RAND J. ECON. 398, 408 (2010) (“[T]he empirical evidence
on suspects’ decisions to speak or remain silent is scarce . . . .”); Seidmann & Stein, supra
note 159, at 435–37 (stating that it may be “altogether impossible” to empirically test R
whether silence indicates guilt or innocence).
168 See People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949, 950 (Cal. 1994).
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even report the rape at all.169  The common assumption about why
people remain silent in this context is based on simply unfounded
intuition.
With regard to silence during a conversation, there are also per-
suasive reasons to question the intuition that silence equals guilt.  Psy-
chologists have found that, for instance, one reason people might
remain silent during a conversation is to assert control over the
speaker.170  The internal dialogue of the silent party is, “As much as
you may want me to respond, I’m just not going to do it!”171  During
an interrogation, suspects may remain silent in response to questions
to take control over the conversation and communicate that they will
not bend to the interrogator’s will.172  Along similar lines, angry peo-
ple often use the “silent treatment” to communicate their disdain to-
ward another person.173  In an interrogation, especially one with a
slew of accusatory questions, suspects may naturally respond with si-
lence to communicate anger toward the interrogator.174
But perhaps there is an even more natural reason to remain si-
lent during a voluntary interview.  A salient example similar to the one
at issue in Salinas illustrates the reason.  So, for a moment, put your-
self in the shoes of Genovevo Salinas and imagine the following
situation:
You were at your friend’s house for a party last night, and a few
hours after you left the party he was stabbed to death.  The very next
day, you agree to interview with police at the station,175 and they start
by asking you questions about what your friend was wearing and how
he was feeling the last time you saw him.  You helpfully answer the
questions.  Then they change tone and ask unexpectedly, “Your fin-
gerprints are going to match the ones we found on the knife, aren’t
they?”176  Think about your reaction.  Are you shocked that you are
actually a suspect?  Are you imagining the consequences of murder?
Are you thinking about the effect that even being a suspect might
have on your family?  Did you “tighten up?”177 Did you “shuffle[ ]
169 See Sherry F. Colb, Assuming Facts Not in Evidence, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 745, 754 (1994).
170 See Thompson, supra note 12, at 46. R
171 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
172 See id. (“[A] suspect in custody may decide to remain silent to challenge the ques-
tioner and send her a message that she cannot force the suspect to talk.”)
173 See id. at 47–48.
174 See id.
175 This was a bad move.
176 Note that this method of abruptly asking an accusatory question is allowed and
actually encouraged by the Salinas decision.  See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying R
text.
177 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
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[your] feet?”178  Did you “bit[e your] bottom lip?”179  You didn’t hesi-
tate, did you?  Hopefully you answered calmly and immediately, be-
cause otherwise your silence and surprised reaction will look a lot like
guilt at trial.
The remainder of this Part delves further into the skepticism that
silence equals guilt.  It first puts forth a legal reason why we might
question our intuition about the meaning of silence.  It then puts
forth a psychological reason, related to the sheer surprise described
above, for why we might reconsider silence.
2. Miranda and the Legal Problem with the Probativeness of Silence
As explained in Part I, the Court hinges the use of silence on
Miranda warnings.  Prosecutors may use silence if it occurred prior to
Miranda warnings;180 however, they may not use post-Miranda silence,
as the suspect may simply be heeding the warnings.181  In other words,
the meaning of post-Miranda silence is “insolubly ambiguous” as the
suspect just learned about his right to remain silent.182
But the distinction between pre-Miranda silence and post-Miranda
silence may progressively be fading. Miranda is now a “part of our
national culture.”183  It is entirely reasonable to believe that individu-
als could heed Miranda warnings without first hearing them from a
police officer.  Indeed, research has shown that, largely due to televi-
sion, most Americans can now recite some form of Miranda warnings
starting with, “You have the right to remain silent.”184  Thus, in volun-
tary interviews, individuals may assume they have the right to remain
silent though no police officer has explicitly informed them of this
right.185  Regardless of whether individuals are correct in this assump-
tion, the widespread understanding of the right to remain silent today
may mean that any silence toward police may simply be reliance on
that right.
This reasoning is especially persuasive when considering a sus-
pect’s silence during an interview with police.  Recall that the Court
uses the term “silence” to mean both muteness in response to a ques-
tion and, more generally, some failure to come forward with informa-
tion.186  Indeed, when the Court originally considered the
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See id. at 2177–78; Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982) (per curiam).
181 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
182 See id.
183 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
184 See Richard Rogers et al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit Assumptions
and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 300, 301 (2010).
185 Id. at 301–02.
186 See supra note 12. R
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prosecution’s use of pre-Miranda silence at trial, the “silence” involved
two defendants who did not immediately come forward with their sto-
ries of self-defense.187  With regard to those specific defendants, it is
somewhat of a stretch to believe they did not immediately come for-
ward because they were relying on their right to remain silent.  On the
other hand, it is quite easy to imagine suspects believing they can rely
on the right to remain silent when asked accusatory questions during
an interview.  Accordingly, especially in a question-and-answer setting,
silence may have very little association with guilt.
3. Psychological Bias
Psychological bias on the part of the interviewing officer may also
play a key role in both the creation and flawed perception of a sus-
pect’s silence.  Bias may also affect the jury’s decision-making process.
This section explores how a cocktail of two well-known psychological
biases, correspondence bias and confirmation bias, may help explain
a suspect’s transitory silence during an interview.
Correspondence bias is the tendency to attribute an individual’s
behavior to a disposition or personality trait rather than to the actual
situation.188  In a famous experiment that illustrated this bias, psychol-
ogists first showed college students essays that either supported or op-
posed Fidel Castro.189  Then the experimenters told the students
either that the writer had freely chosen which stance to take or that a
teacher had instructed the writer to take a particular stance.190  Sur-
prisingly, even when the students knew that the writer was instructed
to take a particular stance, they still believed the writer internally held
that point of view.191  This illustrates that people naturally discount
the power of the situation and instead tend to attribute behavior to a
person’s internal disposition.192
Confirmation bias refers to the tendency to interpret information
in a way that aligns with preexisting beliefs.193  In an early experiment,
psychologists asked participants to come up with a hypothesis based
on a set of data.194  They found that participants only tested the hy-
187 See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
233 (1980).
188 See Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 21, 22, 24 (1995).
189 Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (1967).
190 Id.
191 See id. at 7.
192 See id. at 23.
193 See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
194 See id. at 179.
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pothesis by seeking out data that confirmed the hypothesis.195  In es-
sence, confirmation bias acts like a positive feedback loop that causes
people to try to reinforce what they already believe.
In the context of an interrogation or interview, correspondence
bias should first be concerning given the power of the situation.196
The suspect is “without social support” and usually “stressed, anxious,
scared, [and] confused.”197  Correspondence bias thus posits that po-
lice will interpret any signs of this stress or anxiety as dispositional
rather than as a product of the situation.198
The problem with transitory silence is that police training materi-
als teach police to attribute silence to a very particular disposition:
untruthfulness.199  Per the training materials, if suspects hesitate
before answering questions, they may be untruthful.200  If suspects
nervously rearrange jewelry, chew their fingernails, or rub and wring
their hands, they may be untruthful.201  Indeed, at Salinas’s trial, the
police officer testified that he interpreted Salinas’s transitory silence
and “tighten[ing up]” as “signs of deception.”202  In short, because of
correspondence bias, police are apt to disregard the power of the situ-
ation and attribute any transitory silence or nervousness to
untruthfulness.
Research corroborates the idea that police may overestimate the
significance of certain verbal and nonverbal cues.  Police do not de-
tect untruthfulness any better than chance.203  In fact, one study even
found that individuals trained to detect untruthfulness from police
training materials were actually worse at detecting untruthfulness than
ordinary individuals.204  In essence, psychological studies bear out the
idea that police may be reading too much into cues that they believe
signal untruthfulness, like transitory silence.
195 See id.  This may not bode well for the psychologists cited in this Note.
196 Indeed, the Miranda Court believed custodial interrogations to be so powerfully
coercive that if police do not administer protective warnings, statements by a suspect may
not “truly be the product of his free choice.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
197 Timothy E. Moore & C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and
the Reid Technique, 57 CRIM. L.Q. 509, 513 (2011).
198 See Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judg-




201 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 125, at 152–53. R
202 Salinas v. State, 368 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, 369 S.W.3d 176
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
203 See Moore & Fitzsimmons, supra note 197, at 511–12. R
204 See Kassin & Fong, supra note 198, at 511. Police are also taught to look for signs R
such as “rigid posture, grooming, covering the mouth while speaking, and averting gaze.”
Id.
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Confirmation bias then takes over to create the real problem.
Once police believe that a suspect is untruthful, confirmation bias
posits that they will seek out information that confirms this untruthful-
ness.205  Indeed, research shows that officers who believe a suspect is
untruthful or guilty will ask more accusatory questions.206  This in-
creases the possibility that the suspect will hesitate and show signs of
nervousness at some point during the questioning.207  Interestingly,
suspects also “behavioral[ly] confirm[ ]” the beliefs of the accusatory
officer—suspects answer guilt-presumptive questions more defen-
sively, which police read as more deceptively.208  The result is a dan-
gerous self-fulfilling prophecy where police believe the suspect is
untruthful and continue to shape the interview so that the suspect
looks even more untruthful.209  Because of this self-fulfilling proph-
ecy, police may actually create transitory silence from increasingly de-
fensive suspects.
Of course, when police create transitory silence due to correspon-
dence bias and confirmation bias, the prosecution can now use that
silence as evidence of guilt.210  To bring the psychological biases full
circle, the prosecution’s argument will be persuasive to the jury pre-
cisely because the jury is prone to the correspondence bias.  Corre-
spondence bias posits that the jury too will discount the power of the
situation when it hears about the defendant’s transitory silence.  It too
will fail to appreciate the coercion inherent in an interrogation or
interview.  Just like the police officer, the jury is biased toward think-
ing that the individual was silent in response to a question for an inter-
nal, dispositional reason.  The end result is that silence may be
initially created by police due to confirmation bias and then used as
persuasive evidence of guilt due to correspondence bias.
B. Should Silence Be Inadmissible Per Evidentiary Rules?
At a certain point, judges may find that silence so lacks probative
value that they should not admit it into evidence.  Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 provides that judges may exclude evidence if “its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice.”211 State
courts have evidentiary rules that are virtually identical to Rule 403.212
205 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the
Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 199 (2003).




210 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177–78 (2013).
211 FED. R. EVID. 403.
212 See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 403.
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As this Part has illustrated, there are serious reasons to question
the probative value of silence.  Thus, judges would be reasonable in
finding that silence fails Rule 403’s balancing test.  In fact, the Su-
preme Court has even acknowledged that regardless of its decisions
on silence, jurisdictions remain free to make their own determina-
tions about the probativeness, prejudice, and thus the admissibility, of
silence.213
Accordingly, a defense lawyer might try using an expert to per-
suade the judge that a combination of psychological biases, particu-
larly confirmation bias, on the part of the police officer created the
transitory silence in the first place.  The lawyer might also argue that
silence is unfairly prejudicial as the jury is prone to correspondence
bias when it hears about the silence.  Unfortunately, any discussion of
Rule 403 is necessarily limited because it is difficult to predict how
judges balance discretionary terms like “probative value” and “unfair
prejudice.”  The terms cannot be quantified, and judges simply use
their intuition to admit or exclude evidence of silence.214
Also, disconcertingly for defendants, the language of Rule 403
strongly favors admissibility.  Relevant evidence shall not be excluded
unless “its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair
prejudice.”215  In other words, the evidence must be very significantly
unfairly prejudicial, as compared to its probative value, for the judge
to exclude it.  The rule reflects a desire to have the jury consider as
much relevant evidence as possible.
In short, while Rule 403 provides a way for courts to exclude
silence and thus limit the implications of Salinas, its application is un-
predictable.  Yet judges should educate themselves about the proba-
tive value of silence and consider excluding it altogether.
CONCLUSION
On its face, Salinas v. Texas significantly increases the potential
danger for individuals in voluntary interviews with police.  Prosecutors
may now use the individual’s silence during a voluntary interview as
evidence of guilt, so there is a brand-new way for individuals to incrim-
inate themselves.
Yet Salinas has implications that go beyond a prosecutor’s argu-
ments at trial.  If refusing to answer questions can be evidence of guilt,
213 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (“Each jurisdiction remains free to
formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more pro-
bative than prejudicial.”).
214 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 5214
(2012) (“Discretion is an intuitive process not susceptible to the quantification presup-
posed by the metaphor of the scales.”).
215 FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
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individuals are much more restricted as to whether they can leave vol-
untary interviews.  Given that the custody determination examines
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave the police, Sali-
nas functionally adds a coercive circumstance to the custody analysis.
All voluntary interviews now look more custodial, and the end result is
that courts should find that some individuals who may not have been
in custody pre-Salinas are now in custody post-Salinas.
If courts do not reconsider their custody analyses, voluntary inter-
views are now an even more powerful tool for police.  Police already
do not have to read suspects their Miranda rights in voluntary inter-
views or honor an attempted invocation of those rights. Salinas adds
to the usefulness of voluntary interviews by increasing the chance that
police gather some form of incriminating evidence during the inter-
view.  Groups that are already overrepresented in our criminal justice
system are likely to be most affected by the new danger of voluntary
interviews.
In light of these implications, it is worth asking whether silence is
even probative of guilt in the first place.  Individuals may have a vari-
ety of innocent reasons for remaining silent.  They might be trying to
send an angry message to the questioner.  They might be relying on
their personal knowledge of Miranda rights.  They might simply be
surprised.  The problem is that a police officer or a jury is likely to
attribute any kind of silence to the internal state of the individual.
There is a practical message in this Note.  You should have a plan
for when police approach and ask you to answer some questions at the
station.  In the wake of Salinas v. Texas, declining the interview is
clearly prudent.  Yet one might decline in such a way that minimizes
the appearance of refusal.  For instance, in a calm and collected tone,
you might tell the police, “Although I personally want to help, my
lawyer has told me never to answer questions from police.  I am going
to follow that advice, and I wish you the best of luck.”  That response
may be the least incriminating way to avoid a voluntary interview func-
tioning like a custodial interrogation.
